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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
The Pauper-Short-Changed at the Jury Box
Fear of governmental domination prompted the founders of the
United States to restrict governmental interference with individual
liberties. Indeed, the Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution to
prohibit tampering with preferred freedoms. One such prohibition is
that no citizen can be deprived of his life, liberty or property solely
upon governmental accusations. Such deprivation can follow only
after determination of guilt by a jury of the individual's peers.' How-
ever, West Virginia statutorily denies paupers this fundamental right
to a trial by their peers. This denial constitutes an invidious discrim-
ination violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Distinctions among individuals are constantly drawn because of
some characteristic, e.g., race, religion, sex, wealth. "It is well known
that prejudices often exist against particular classes in the commu-
nity, which sway the judgment of jurors . . . ."' Therefore, the ideal
jury should be composed of citizens possessing characteristics similar
to the defendant. The Supreme Court, however, in balancing society's
interest against that of the defendant, realized that this composition
lacks practicality and feasibility. "Society also has a right to a fair
trial. The defendant's right is a neutral jury. He has no constitutional
right to friends on the jury."4
A neutral jury is obtained by indiscriminately selecting its mem-
bers from all citizens eligible for jury service.5 It must reflect a
reasonable cross-section of the community.' "This does not mean, of
I"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "In Suits
at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved. ... U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law, and the judgment of his peers." W. VA. CONST. art. 3, § 10.
2 "No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsTr. amend. XIV, § 1.
3 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1880).
4 Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 288-89 (1947). Hoyt v. Florida, 368
U.S. 57, 59 (1961) stated that an accused is not entitled 'to a jury tailored
to the circumstances of the particular case . . . or to the nature of the
charges to be tried."
5 Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 59 (1961).6 Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946); Smith v. Texas,
311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940). In Thiel the Court was exercising its power of
supervision over the administration of justice in federal courts. This power
is not restricted to the principles of the Constitution. Accordingly the Court
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course, that every jury must contain representatives of all the eco-
nomic, social, religious, racial, political and geographical groups of
the community; frequently such complete representation would be
impossible."" Nor does it mean that the jury must contain a propor-
tionate representation or even any representation of those persons
who have the same characteristics as the defendant.8 "But it does
mean that prospective jurors shall be selected by court officials with-
out systematic and intentional exclusion of any of these groups."9
Such patent exclusions permit prejudices-not evidence-to
determine guilt."0 It has long been held that a defendant is denied
equal protection of the laws when convicted by a jury from which
citizens of his class were arbitrarily excluded." Hence, no qualifi-
cations for jury service can be founded on a class basis. 2
There is no prohibition against states setting standards which
citizens must meet before they can serve on juries. Indeed, standards
may be established which in fact exclude a particular class of per-
has "greater freedom to reflect [their] notions of good policy than [they]
may constitutionally exert over proceedings in state courts .... Fay v.
New York, 332 U.S. 261, 287 (1947). See also McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332 (1943). Equal protection however is not a static concept and
may expand to include such "good policy" as constitutional mandates. Cf.
Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966).7 Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (supervising
federal courts); accord, Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208 (1965)
(constitutional rule); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1945) (constitu-
tional rule).
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208 (1965); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S.
398, 403 (1945); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 394 (1881).
9 Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946). "The defendant's
concern with the jury selection process is that if it does not reduce the
amount of prejudice which finds its way into the jury box, at least the process
does not increase the amount." Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase,
41 S. CAL,. L. Rlv. 235, 243 (1968).
10 Allowing such exclusion "would give free rein to those who wittingly
or otherwise act to undermine the very foundations of this system and would
make juries ready weapons for officials to oppress those accused individuals
who by chance are numbered among unpopular or inarticulate minorities."
Aldns v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 408 (1945) (Murphy, I., dissenting); accord,
Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 223-24 (1946). The Supreme
Court has also stated the "[u]ndoubtedly a system of exclusions could
be so manipulated as to call a jury before which defendants would have so
little chance of a decision on the evidence that it would constitute a denial
of due process." Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 288 (1947).
" The first case to so hold was Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303 (1880). Accord, e.g., Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967); Hernan-
dez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950);
Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881).
12 "Jurymen should be selected as individuals, on the basis of individual
qualifications, and not as members of a race." Casseli v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282,
286 (1950); accord, Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U. S. 217, 220 (1946).
2
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sons; 3 but such standards must be relevant to the individual's ability
to serve as a juror. Resulting classifications must be reasonable and
rest on a rational foundation. 4
I. CLASSIFICATION IN WEST VIRGINIA
The West Virginia statutes regulating petit jury selection seem
to create an irrational and unreasonable classification. The article
in the code relating to petit juries begins with the broad pronounce-
ment that "[a]ll persons, who are twenty-one years of age and not
over sixty-five, and who are citizens of this State, shall be liable to
serve as jurors . . . ." However, the section following restricts this
general eligibility by disqualifying from jury service those groups
incapable of rational judgment, i.e., lunatics, idiots, and habitual
drunkards. 6 Additionally, "paupers" are disqualified by that section.
This disqualification may have arisen from one of two possible
theories. It may have evolved as a sanction to punish those who allow
themselves to become dependents of the state; but it is now known
that such dependency is usually the result of environmental circum-
stances, not choice.
There are, one must assume, citizens ... who choose im-
poverishment out of fear of work (though, writing it down,
I really do not believe it). But the real explanation of why
the poor are where they are is that they made the mistake
of being born to the wrong parents, in the wrong section of
the country, in the wrong industry, or in the wrong racial
or ethnic group. Once that mistake has been made, they
could have been paragons of will and morality, but most
of them would never even have had a chance to get
out .... 
1 7
13 Cf. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S.
261 (1947).
14 See Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Hoyt v. Florida,
368 U.S. 57 (1961); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947). See also cases
involving other subjects: Lassiter v. Northhampton County Bd. of Elections,
360 U.S. 45 (1959) (suffrage); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957) (lic-
enses); American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89 (1900) (tax-
ation). Contra 1967 DUKE L.J 346, 352-53.
15 W. VA. CODE ch. 52, art. 1, § 1 (Michie 1966).
16The following persons shall be disqualified from serving on juries:
Idiots, lunatics, paupers, vagabonds, habitual drunkards, and persons convicted
of infamous crimes." W. VA. CODE ch. 52, art. 1, § 2 (Michie 1966).
17 M. HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERIcA 14-15 (1962).
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It may also have been based "on the theory that there is some
reasonable relationship between their poverty and their ability to
act as jurors."" But poverty does not itself limit one's "ability to
understand and judge the issues of a typical trial." 9 Some individuals
may be paupers as a result of mental incapacity or illiteracy, and the
state can properly exclude these individuals from jury service."
However, it is a "violent presumption" that all paupers are disquali-
fied.2
Recognition must be given to the fact that those eligible
for jury service are to be found in every stratum of society.
Jury competence is an individual rather than a group or
class matter. That fact lies at the very heart of the jury
system. To disregard it is to open the door to class dis-
tinctions and discriminations which are abhorrent to the
democratic ideals of trial by jury.2
The same standards which exclude non-paupers who are lunatics,
idiots, and habitual drunkards must be used to exclude incompetent
paupers-not a systematic exclusion. This disqualification of all
paupers is an irrational and unreasonable means of obtaining compe-
tent jurors.
m. UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
There is little doubt that the disqualification of paupers from
jury service is unconstitutional, although it has never been chal-
lenged. Most cases which have found a jury selection system to
deny equal protection have involved racial exclusions. 3 But "the
'8 Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 235,
306 (1968). Kuhn was referring to indigents in general. "Pauper" technically
means "[a] person so poor that he must be supported at public expense."
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1284 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). Currently an increased
awareness of poverty has caused the word often to be used as a synonym for
indigent. However, the meaning with which to be concerned is the one used
by the jury commissioners. This note assumes they use the technical one.
19 Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. REv. 235,
306 (1968).
20 See cases cited note 14 supra.
21 Cf. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 397 (1880).
2 2 Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946).23 Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396
U.S. 320 (1970); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967); Cassell v. Texas,
316 U.S. 400 (1942); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Bush v.
Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1883); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881);
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). Indeed the fourteenth amend-
ment was drafted to eliminate racial discrimination. See Strauder v. West Vir-
ginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1880); Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36, 81 (1873).
4
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constitutional command forbidding intentional exclusion [is not]
limited to Negroes. It applies to any identifiable group in the com-
munity which may be the subject of prejudice."" Thus, the initial
burden in challenging the West Virginia statute is to prove that the
classification "pauper' is an invidiously discriminatory one25
Classifications become suspect when the affected groups are
politically impotent, stigmatized as inferior and disgraceful, and dis-
tinguished by an unalterable trait.2" Upon examination it is seen that
paupers possess all of these requisites. Until recently they were poli-
tically unorganized; by definition they lack economic power; and
they have long been considered inferior. They may not, however, be
distinguished by an unalterable trait; they might be able to escape
from poverty through employment. But much respectable opinion
has now concluded that poverty is often selfperpetuating and there-
fore an unalterable condition.2" Thus paupers likely are a suspect
group, at least where important personal rights such as trial by
jury are involved.28
The right to trial by one's peers seems to be as important as
the right to vote. In fact, the Supreme Court has stated that "the
State may no more extend [jury service] to some of its citizens and
2 4 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 204-05 (1965). Accord, Hoyt v.
Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 59-60 (1961); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475,
477-78 (1954). See also Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947); Pierre v.
Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939).25 In Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954), the systematic exclusion
of persons of Mexican descent from jury service was held to have deprived
the defendant of equal protection of the laws. The Court stated that "[the
petitioner's initial burden in substantiating his charge of group discrimination
was to prove that persons of Mexican descent constitute a separate class in
Jackson County, distinct from 'whites.' ld. at 479. Since the classification
of paupers is not based upon race, stronger proof than merely a separate class
may be necessary before the classification becomes unconstitutional. There-
fore, it is assumed that an invidiously discriminatory classification is necessary.2 Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV.L. Rnv. 1065,1124-27 (1969).
27E.g., Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers, 1964
EcoNomnc REPORT OF THM PRESIDENT 69-70:
Poverty breeds poverty. A poor individual or family has a high probabil-
ity of staying poor. Low incomes carry with them high risks of illness;
limitations on mobility; limited access to education; information, and
training. Poor parents cannot give their children the opportunities for
better health and education needed to improve their lot. Lack of moti-
vation, hope, and incentive is a more subtle but no less powerful barrier
than lack of financial means. Thus the cruel legacy of poverty is passed
from parents to children.
Although this statement was referring to all poor persons, it is particularly
applicable to paupers. These same factors often foreclose all employment
opportunities.11 See Developments in the Law, supra note 26.
[Vol. 74
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deny it to others on racial grounds than it may invidiously discrimi-
nate in the offering and withholding of the elective franchise." 9 The
state also should be no more able to deny jury service on the basis
of wealth than it is able to deny suffrage on the basis of wealth; and
[w] ealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to ones
ability to participate intelligently in the electoral process.
Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like those
of race . . ., are traditionally disfavored. To introduce
wealth or payment of a fee as a measure of a voter's quali-
fications is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor.
The degree of the discrimination is irrelevant. In this con-
text-that is, as a condition of abtaining a ballot-the re-
quirement of fee paying causes an "invidious" discrimina-
tion.., that runs afoul of the Equal Protection Clause."0
One denial of jury service on the basis of wealth has been struck
down by the Supreme Court.' Day laborers were excluded from
federal jury lists because of the financial difficulty jury service im-
posed. The Court feared that "[w]ere we to sanction an exclusion
of this nature we would encourage whatever desires those respon-
sible for the selection of jury panels may have to discriminate against
persons of low economic and social status. We would breathe life
into any latent tendencies to establish the jury as the instrument of
the economically and socially privileged. That we refuse to do."32
Although the Court was exercising its jurisdiction over the adminis-
tration of justice in federal courts, prohibiting such discrimination is
more than good policy and is probably required by the Constitu-
tion.33
After establishing the pauper's existence as a class, discrimi-
nation must be proven.34 All that is necessary is an admission by the
29 Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970).
°30 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966). Other
areas where invidious discrimination based upon wealth was found violative
of the equal protection clause include imprisonment for nonpayment of fine,
Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); access to the courts, Boddie v. Connecti-
cut, 401 U.S. 371, 383 (Douglas, J., concurring); right to counsel on appeal,
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); free transcripts, Griffin v. Illi-
nois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
31 Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946).32
1d. at 223-24.
33 See note 6 supra.3 4 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 480 (1954); accord, Whitus v.
Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 559 (1967); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 261, 284-
85 (1947).
6
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jury commissioners that in making the jury list they followed the
statute.3" It is patently discriminatory; it excludes all paupers.
IV. STANDING
Two avenues exist for challenging this discrimination. First, a
pauper, as a defendant in a criminal action, can challenge the ver-
dict if paupers were systematically excluded from the jury. 6 Simil-
arly a pauper involved in a civil action should be able to challenge a
verdict against him." Secondly, a class action can be instituted on
behalf of all paupers.38 They are entitled to the same rights as other
citizens. No matter which avenue is used to challenge the constitu-
tionality of the statute, the outcome should be the same-judicial
deletion of the word "paupers" from the statute.
35 Cf. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950). "The statements of the
jury commissioners that they chose only whom they knew, and that they knew
no eligible Negroes in an area where Negroes made up so large a proportion
of the population, prove the intentional exclusion that is discrimination in
violation of petitioner's constitutional rights." Id. at 290; accord Hill v. Texas,
316 U.S. 400, 404 (1942). See also Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1880).36 See Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967); Hernandez v. Texas, 347
U.S. 475 (1954); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Norris v Alabama,
294 U.S. 587 (1935); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). The
person convicted has to be a member of the excluded class before he can
show a denial of equal protection and obtain a constitutional reversal of a
state conviction. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 287 (1947). However, such
membership is not necessary for reversible error in the federal courts. Exer-
cising its power of supervision over the administration of federal justice, the
Supreme Court has ruled that "reversible error does not depend on a showing
of prejudice in an individual case. The evil lies in the admitted exclusion of
an eligible class or group in the community .... The injury is not limited to
the defendent-there is injury to the jury system, to the law as an institution,
to the community at large, and to the democratic ideal reflected in the pro-
cesses of our courts." Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946). This
membership requirement may eventually be eliminated even for constitutional
challenges to state convictions by a changing notion of equality. Cf. Harper
v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966).
3 7 Juries for civil proceedings should be just as impartial as juries for
criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court, supervising the administration of
justice in the federal courts, allows any party to a civil action to challenge the
verdict where some class was systematically excluded from the jury. He need
not be a member of the excluded class or show he was prejudiced. Thiel v.
Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946). For a discussion of its applicability
to state courts see note 28 supra.
38 See Carter v. Jury Commission, 396 U.S. 320 (1970). The Court said:
People excluded from juries because of their race are as much aggrieved
as those indicted and tried by juries chosen under a system of racial ex-
clusion. Surely there is no jurisdictional or procedural bar to an attack
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V. ADMINISTRATION
Although deletion of "paupers" from the statute will make it
constitutional on its face, the potential for gross underrepresentation
will linger because of the administration of West Virginia's jury selec-
tion system. Under this system jury commissioners prepare a list of
inhabitants whom they believe "well qualified to serve as jurors, being
persons of sound judgment, of good moral character, and free from
legal exception."39 No mechanics are prescribed for the preparation
of this list. Thus the system seems overly broad, leaving the commis-
sioners unrestrained in their exercise of discretion. It appears at first
blush the system could be vulnerable to attack on constitutional
grounds because it fails to establish any standards for jury selection,
but the United States Supreme Court has rejected this contention in
cases challenging statutes similar to West Virginia's.40 The Court
felt the terms did set up standards which could be properly applied
and did not themselves discriminate against any class.
It seems only natural that the jury commissioners, in fulfilling
the duties of their office, would select jurors who they know are
qualified. But such knowledge is limited mainly to personal acquain-
tances, and these are probably most often citizens of the commis-
sioners' general economic status. Therefore, although deletion of
"paupers" will make the jury selection system valid on its face, its
administration may exclude paupers and continue the invidious dis-
crimination sought to be eliminated.4 The Supreme Court has at-
39 W. VA. CODE ch. 52, art. 1 § 4 (Michie 1966). The jury commissioners
are two persons in each county appointed by the circuit court. They are "of
opposite politics, citizens of good standing, residents in the county for which
they are appointed, and well-known members of the principal political par-
ties thereof." W. VA. CODE ch. 52, art 1, § 3 (Michie 1966).4 0 Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970) ("upright" and "intelligent"
jurors); Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970) (jurors "honest and
intelligent and ... esteemed in the community for their integrity, good char-
acter and sound judgment"); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 161 (1940) (no unfit
or unqualified jurors); Franklin v. South Carolina, 218 U.S. 161 (1910)
(jurors "of good moral character" and "otherwise well qualified to serve as
jurors, being persons of sound judgment and free from all legal exceptions").
These cases all involved racial discrimination and may be distinguishable from
discrimination against indigents. The jury commissioners may believe poverty
indicated the person lacks "sound judgment," However, this would probably
be a tenuous distinction.
41 A conviction or judgment against a pauper can still be challenged by
him even if "paupers" is deleted from the statute. If he shows the absence or
substantial underrepresentation of paupers on the jury lists over a long period
of time, he makes a prima facie case of discrimination which the state must
rebut. See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); Whitus v. Georgia, 385
U.S. 545 (1967); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Norris v Alaba-
8
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tempted to eliminate administrative discrimination by holding that
standards such as West Virginia's impose a duty upon the jury com-
missioners to familiarize themselves with all eligible jurors in the
county without regard to any class distinctions. 2 If they do not, they
are excluding eligible members of the ignored class.4 The resultant
discrimination is as violative of the equal protection clause as inten-
tional discrimination.44
The duty imposed is too onerous. What is really needed is a
legislative reconstruction of the entire system. 45 The discretion of the
jury commissioners in selecting citizens for the jury list should be
eliminated. Specific sources need to be prescribed for gathering names
of all persons liable for jury service. Unfortunately, a complete list
would probably be impossible without conducting an annual census
or requiring population registration; but a combination of sources
such as voters registration, income taxpayers, welfare recipients, and
motor vehicle registrants and drivers would render a fairly compre-
hensive list.46 This list could then be alphabetized and so many names
selected by some random selection process, such as every nth name.47
ma, 294 U.S. 587 (1935). See also Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical
Decision Theory to the Jury Discrimination Cases, 80 HARv L. REV. 338,
349 (1966-67).42 Cases cited note 40 supra.
43 Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 289 (1950); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S.
400, 404 (1942).44 Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 360 (1970); Cassell v. Texas 339
U.S. 282, 289, (1950); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 404 (1942); Smith v.
Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 132 (1940).
4 5 An alternative would be for the legislature to delegate authority to
the judiciary for regulating jury selection. The courts could develop a practi-
cal system and amend it whenever necessary.
46 Such a system is used in Alaska:
The jury list shall be based on a list of all persons who purchased a resi-
dent trapping, hunting or fishing license during the preceding calendar
year which showed an Alaskan address (to be prepared by the Depart-
ment of Fish and Game), a list of all persons who filed a state income
tax return during the preceding calendar year which showed an Alaskan
address (to be prepared by the Department of Revenue), and a list of
all persons who have registered to vote in this state (to be prepared by
the lieutenant governor).
ALAs. STAT. § 09.20.050 (b) (Michie Supp. 1971).
47 "Statisticians have developed techniques of random selection that can
be applied without special skill. Most of the time taking every nth name will
suffice." Zeisel, Dr. Spock and the Case of the Vanishing Women Jurors, 37
U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 16 (1969). At least two states have adopted this method
already-Illinois ("choosing every tenth name, or other whole number rate
necessary to obtain the number required," ILL. ANN. STAT. ch 78, § 1
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972) ) and Ohio (selecting names "as the key number
..., or the multiples thereof, appear opposite said names on said list," Omo
REV. CoDE AN .§ 2313.08 (Page Supp. 1970) ).
(Vol. 74
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Those persons selected could then be examined for qualifications.48
In this manner much of the discretion would be eliminated, and any
deviations from the procedure would be more easily detected.4 9 In
addition the impossible duty of ascertaining the qualifications of all
eligible jurors would be taken from the jury commissioners'
Jeffrey J. Yost
411ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 78, § 12 (Smith-Hurd 1966), provides for the
judge to examine the jurors to determine "who are qualified and not subject
to any exemption, or any of the disqualifications provided."
49 "If the rules of random selection are violated, the resulting list reveals
the flaw." Zeisel, Dr. Spock and the Case of the Vanishing Women Jurors, 37
U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 17 (1969).50 Although not affecting paupers, another factor which causes the lower
economic class to be underrepresented on juries is the low petit jurors' fees
-five to eight dollars per day. W. VA. CODE ch. 52, art. 1, § 21 (Michie
1966). Those persons who are employed at minimum wage cannot afford to
miss work because they need every possible dollar to subsist, and they are
accordingly excused from jury duty. Jurors need to be paid fees equivalent
at least to the minimum wage, "fees that enable all to serve." Kuhn, Jury
Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L. Rav. 235, 323 (1968). Ala-
bama has done this by requiring the juror's employer to pay the juror the
difference between the juror's fee and his usual compensation. ALA. CODE tit.
30 § 7 (1) (Michie Supp. 1969).
10
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